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Abstract 
This study examines whether unconscious processing of misleading post-event information 
can influence explicit and implicit eyewitness memory. Using the existing misinformation 
paradigm, false post-event information was presented to participants either under full or 
divided attention. Eyewitness memory was tested with both explicit (free recall and cued 
recall tests) and implicit memory tests (truth rating test). Participants who were misinformed 
under full attention recalled significantly more misinformation than their counterparts who 
were misinformed under divided attention and the control group. However, results from the 
truth rating test showed that both explicit and implicit forms of misinformation had no impact 
on implicit eyewitness memory. Since this study is the first to examine the effect of post-
event information on implicit eyewitness memory, there is much room for improvement in 
the selection and design of the implicit memory test that is suitable for eyewitness setting. 
Other limitations and potential directions for future research are also discussed. 
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Can Implicit Post-Event Information Influence Eyewitness Memory Explicitly?  
 Eyewitnesses are an important source of evidence which helps identify suspects and 
prosecute offences (Buckhout, 1975; Engelhardt, 1999; Flowe, Mehta & Ebbesen, 2011; 
Wells & Olson, 2003). In the report, The Criminal Investigation Process (1975), one of the 
most important determinants of whether a case was solved is the presence of an eyewitness. 
However, a recent analysis on DNA exoneration cases, between 1992 and 2009, revealed that 
more than 70% of false convictions was a result of eyewitness misidentification (Kassin, 
Bogart & Kerner, 2012). For example, 88% of exonerations in rape cases and half of the 
exonerations in murder cases involved victims’ misidentification of the perpetrators (Gross, 
Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery & Patil, 2005). These findings thus cast doubt upon the 
credibility and probative value of eyewitness evidence. 
 Many studies have examined the possible mechanisms leading to erroneous recollections 
on the part of eyewitnesses (e.g., Cutler, Penrod & Martens, 1987; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978, Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Some of the factors which might compromise eyewitness 
testimony include new information supplied after an event (i.e., post-event information) 
(Loftus, 1974; Loftus, 1975), a long retention interval (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), and high 
weapon visibility during the event (Cutler et al., 1987). Of these factors, post-event 
information (PEI) has received substantial attention over the past 40 years’ (Loftus, 2005). 
The research examining the impact of PEI has shown that eyewitnesses are not only 
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susceptible to memory loss over time, but also memory distortion due to misleading PEI 
(Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). The incorporation of PEI in eyewitness memory is referred to as 
the misinformation effect (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). However, when examining the 
misinformation effect, the research to date has examined instances in which the participants 
are explicitly attending to the PEI. It is unclear, though, whether implicitly presented PEI may 
similarly lead to the misinformation effect. Indeed, witnesses may be bombarded with 
different types of information from various sources, e.g., when they talk to other co-
witnesses, overhear others’ discussions, and receive new information from the media or 
interrogators (Loftus, 1991). It is unlikely that witnesses could attend to all sources of PEI, 
which, in turn, leads to the possibility that they may incorporate some PEI unconsciously. The 
present study therefore seeks to extend the literature on the misinformation effect by 
examining whether implicitly presented PEI may shape the extent to which eyewitnesses 
explicitly and implicitly recall a crime scene.  
 In what follows I will discuss 1) the robust research examining PEI and eyewitness 
memory, 2) the mechanisms argued to lead to the misinformation effect, and 3) how 
implicitly presented PEI may be related to the misinformation effect. 
Misinformation Effect 
 Research examining the misinformation effect typically followed a three-stage 
procedure: 1) participants first view an event, 2) they are then exposed to misleading 
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information about the event, and finally 3) the participants take a memory test about the 
witnessed event (see, e.g., Loftus, 1991). In Loftus’ first study, which employed this three-
stage procedure, participants were presented with a series of slides depicting an auto-
pedestrian accident (Loftus et al., 1978). One of the slides was altered so that half of the 
participants saw the car stopped at a stop sign while the other half saw the car stopped at a 
yield sign (Loftus et al., 1978). In the second stage of the experiment, all participants filled 
out a questionnaire asking them about the details of the accident. For half of the participants, 
one of the items in this questionnaire asked them whether they saw another vehicle passing 
the car while it was stopped at the stop sign. For the remaining participants, they were asked 
the same question with the words “stop sign” replaced by “yield sign”. The remaining items 
in that questionnaire were identical for all participants. In the final stage, all participants took 
a forced-choice recognition test about the accident they viewed earlier. In this test, 15 pairs of 
slides were presented; one of each pair was old and the other one was new (Loftus et al., 
1978). Participants were instructed to select the slide that they had seen during the accident. 
One of the pairs was the critical pair: it included a slide showing the car stopped at the stop 
sign, and a similar slide which showed the car stopped at a yield sign (Loftus et al., 1978). 
The results showed that participants who were exposed to misinformation during the second 
stage were more likely to identify the slide with the wrong traffic sign (Loftus et al., 1978). 
This study demonstrated that when people are exposed to misleading information (e.g. 
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suggestive questions) after they witnessed an event, their memory for the witnessed event 
might be distorted by information they come in contact with after the original event. 
 Research has also shown how misinformation effect can be introduced through 
narratives containing false information, or through the discussions people have with co-
witnesses (which is known as the social contagion effect) (e.g., Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 
2003; Meade & Roediger, 2002, Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). In explaining why such instances 
of misinformation effect occur, researchers have argued that they are the result of failure of 
source monitoring. 
Source Monitoring 
 According to the source monitoring model, when an individual is witnessing an event, 
the event memory and the source of that event memory (i.e., the time and place where the 
memory is derived) are stored (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Sometimes, however, 
people will misremember the source of the memory, in other words, they misjudge the origin 
of an event memory (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). In the eyewitness setting, the source 
monitoring model suggests that misinformation effect occurs when the misinformed 
witnesses erroneously identify memories for PEI as memories acquired from the witnessed 
event (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, in Loftus et al.’s (1978) original study, the memory 
for the accident and the source memory for the accident were encoded when participants were 
viewing the slides at the beginning (Time 1). After that, participants filled out a questionnaire 
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which asked about the accident they just witnessed (Time 2). When they were filling out this 
questionnaire, the memory for misinformation presented in the questionnaire and the source 
memory for the questionnaire were stored. The following recognition memory test was a test 
of participants’ source memory for the witnessed accident because participants had to judge 
which slide they had encountered at Time 1. Participants who were exposed to misleading 
information at Time 2 were found to be more likely to choose the slide with the wrong sign in 
the recognition memory test because they mistook the source of that information as 
emanating from Time 1 instead of Time 2 and, thus, exhibit the misinformation effect. 
 Johnson et al. (1993) noted that source monitoring relies fundamentally on the quality of 
the information stored about the events. Factors such as stress and divided attention disrupt 
people’s normal perceptual and encoding processes, which may lead to the storage of 
incomplete information (Johnson et al., 1993). If the information acquired about an event is 
impoverished, identification of the source of that memory becomes more difficult and prone 
to errors (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). As source confusion is a major contributor to the 
misinformation effect (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994; Lindsay, Allen, 
Chan & Dahl, 2004), the quality of the PEI encoded could be an important factor which 
determines the strength of the misinformation effect. Specifically, if witnesses acquire 
misleading PEI unconsciously, they might be more likely to confuse the source of PEI with 
the source of the witnessed event because of a lack of source-specifying information of the 
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PEI (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). While this possibility has yet to be examined within the 
eyewitness literature, there is evidence suggesting that people can be influenced by prior 
information that they learned unconsciously (e.g., Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby, Woloshyn 
& Kelley, 1989). This is known as implicit learning.  
Implicit Learning 
 A classic study conducted by Jacoby et al. (1989) demonstrated that unconsciously-
learnt information could affect people’s subsequent perceptual performance. The authors 
instructed participants to study a list of famous and non-famous names; half of the 
participants studied them under full attention while the other half under divided attention. A 
recognition memory test of these names was then administered to the participants; 
unsurprisingly, participants who studied the names under divided attention performed worse 
than their counterparts in the full attention condition (Jacoby et al., 1989). A fame judgement 
test was also administered. In this test, a list which comprised names that had been presented 
and new non-famous names was given to the participants and they were asked to judge how 
famous each name was. It was found that participants in the divided attention condition 
demonstrated a tendency to judge the non-famous names that they encountered before as 
famous (Jacoby et al., 1989). Since these participants learned the non-famous names under 
divided attention, the source-specifying information of these names was not stored 
completely. This resulted in a mere feeling of familiarity of the names (Jacoby et al., 1989; 
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Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). This phenomenon, the false fame effect, 
demonstrates how divided attention may impair people’s ability to accurately monitor the 
source of memory (Jacoby et al., 1989). 
 Another study conducted by Perfect and Askew (1994) investigated whether 
advertisements presented without participants’ attention would influence their attitudes 
towards those adverts. In their experiment, the authors asked half of the participants to 
examine the layout of a magazine while the other half to read the adverts in the magazine. As 
a result, the first group of participants were exposed to the magazine’s adverts unconsciously 
while the second group viewed the adverts deliberately. A test was then administered to all 
participants. This test comprised the presented adverts and new adverts; participants were 
asked to rate how appealing and eye-catching each of these adverts was (Perfect & Askew, 
1994). In addition, participants were instructed to indicate which of the adverts they 
recognized as having been presented previously. The results showed that participants who 
viewed the adverts unconsciously remembered less presented adverts than those who 
deliberately read the adverts. However, both groups of participants demonstrated a positive 
bias in attitudes towards the adverts that they had been exposed to (Perfect & Askew, 1994). 
 Additionally, unconsciously learned information could influence people’s perceived 
credibility of such information even though they may not overtly recall learning it (Begg, 
Anas & Farinacci, 1992). Begg et al. (1992) conducted a series of experiments to examine 
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whether implicit learning could influence people’s judgment about the credibility of 
information. In one of their experiments, Begg et al. (1992) presented statements to 
participants who were either under full or divided attention. Participants were also informed 
which statements were true and which were false. After that, participants were given a list 
that included old and new statements, and were instructed to rate the truthfulness of each 
statement. They then completed a recognition test of the statements. It was found that 
participants from the divided attention condition recognized fewer statements than their 
counterparts in the full attention condition; however, they were more likely to rate the old 
statements as true than the new statements (Begg et al., 1992).  
 Thus, based on this line of literature, it is possible that unconscious learning of 
erroneous PEI may bias the recall of an eyewitness. In real-life eyewitness situation, 
witnesses come across PEI from different sources and they may learn some of the 
misinformation unintentionally. Although the implicitly-acquired PEI might not be 
recollected consciously, it might affect witnesses’ subsequent perception of the credibility of 
the misinformation. For instance, they might become biased towards other co-witnesses’ 
testimony or a certain individual from the lineup that match the misinformation they learned 
unconsciously. The change in the witnesses’ perception of the misinformation may in turn be 
internalized and become part of their eyewitness memory over time. The current study 
therefore investigated whether exposure to misleading PEI under divided attention may lead 
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eyewitnesses to perceive the misinformation to be more truthful. 
Study Overview 
 In order to examine whether misinformation, presented under divided attention, shapes 
the extent to which participants rate the information as truthful, modifications were made to 
the existing misinformation paradigm in the following ways: 1) misinformed participants 
either received PEI under full or divided attention, and 2) an implicit memory test was 
administered in addition to the conventional explicit memory tests. There were three 
experimental conditions in this study: control, misinformed under full attention (FA) and 
misinformed under divided attention (DA). Participants’ explicit memory was assessed with 
free recall and cued recall tests. This was done to ensure replication of the standard 
misinformation effect. To assess their implicit memory, participants completed a truth-rating 
test; this test has been used in the study conducted by Begg et al. (1992) as an implicit 
measure of memory. The truth rating test included 1) statements that were true descriptions of 
the witnessed event, 2) statements that repeated misinformation, 3) true statements that 
described the details about which misinformation was supplied, and 4) new statements that 
were false descriptions of the event. 
 The first hypothesis of this study was that participants in the FA group would mistakenly 
recall more PEI than the control group and the DA group did during the explicit memory 
tests. The second hypothesis predicted that both the DA and FA groups would rate statements 
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which repeated the misinformation they had been exposed to as truer than the control group 
did. The third hypothesis predicted that both misinformed groups would exhibit a specific 
pattern in their truth ratings, that is, they would rate the true statements as more credible than 
the repeated information, and the repeated misinformation would be rated as more credible 
than the false new statements.  
Method 
Participants and Research Design 
Sixty participants (16 male) were recruited via an online experiment sign-up system at 
an urban college in the Northeast of the United States. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 
33 years (M = 20.46, SD = 3.17). Each participant received a course credit for his/her 
participation. At the beginning of the study, participants were told that the study examined the 
effect of emotional arousal on cognitive functioning. The experimental design of this study 
consisted of one between-subjects factor, i.e., presentation of misinformation: no 
misinformation (control condition, n = 20), full attention (FA condition, n = 20), and divided 
attention (DA condition, n = 20). 
Materials 
Short film. The stimulus in the experiment was a 42-second video depicting an armed 
robbery in a café. The video showed two men entering the café with firearms and robbing the 
customers (see Appendix A for a detailed description of the crime event).  
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Audio narrative. A 57-second audio narrative was created to describe the crime video 
but it included five false facts about the crime. These false facts were generated by altering 
five critical details selected from the crime video. Four of these false facts were related to the 
people’s appearances while the remaining one was related to the crime scene (see Appendix 
B for the audio narrative transcript). The audio narrative was recorded with a female voice at 
a constant speech rate. 
Tone-counting task. The stimulus used in the tone-counting task for the control and DA 
groups was a series of randomly-generated tones that were either low-pitched (1000 Hz) or 
high-pitched (2500 Hz). Each tone lasted for 50 milliseconds and the whole series of tones 
matched the length of time of the audio narrative. The tones were played via headphones and 
participants were instructed to report the number of high-pitched tones that they heard. The 
tone-counting task has been employed in several divided attention studies (e.g. Frensch, 
Wenke & Rünger, 1999; Pedersen & Rist, 2001). 
Distractor tasks. In order to prevent participants from rehearsing the video details or 
the misinformation in the audio narrative after their presentation, two distractor tasks were 
included in this experiment. 
After viewing the video, participants engaged in the first distractor task which prevented 
them from rehearsing the content of the video. This distractor task was necessary because a 
previous eyewitness study found that immediate recall of the crime event could inoculate 
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participants against misinformation (Wang, Paterson and Kemp, 2013). The Affective Style 
Questionnaire (Hofmann & Kashdan, 2010) was used as this distractor task because it was 
irrelevant to this study and it helped support the cover story about the purpose of the 
experiment. This questionnaire contained 20 items and participants were instructed to rate 
how true of them each item is on a five-point scale (1 = not true of me at all; 5 = extremely 
true of me). Sample items included “People usually can’t tell how I am feeling inside” and “I 
can tolerate being upset” (Hofmann & Kashdan, 2010). Participants’ responses to this 
questionnaire were not analyzed. 
After the audio task (in which the misinformed participants received the 
misinformation), participants summarized a 4,000-word news article that was unrelated to the 
study and they were told that this task assessed their reading comprehension. The purpose of 
this distractor task was to prevent the misinformed participants from recalling the content of 
the audio narrative. Participants spent 15 minutes on this distractor task.  
Free recall test. Participants’ explicit memory was tested with a free recall test. The test 
contained the following instruction: “In the space provided please report all the details that 
you can remember about the event and the people involved; including as much detail as you 
can about the sequence of events and the offenders. Please do not leave any details out, but 
do not guess about details that you cannot remember. Feel free to use full sentences or bullet 
points, but make sure that your report is as accurate as possible” (see, e.g., Gabbert, Hope & 
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Fisher, 2009). 
Cued recall test. After the free recall test, participants received a cued recall test which 
comprised five open-ended questions. These five questions concerned the five pieces of 
misinformation that were supplied in the audio narrative. For instance, one of the victims in 
the video was wearing a black coat. However, the audio narrative stated that the coat was 
green. The cued recall test item corresponding for this detail asked the participants what was 
the color of the coat that victim was wearing (see Appendix C). 
Truth rating test. This study used the truth rating test to assess participants’ implicit 
memory of the misinformation (Begg et al., 1992). This test contained four types of 
statements: 1) true descriptions about the original event, 2) repeated misinformation, 3) true 
statements that described the details about which misinformation was supplied, and 4) new 
false descriptions about the event (see Appendix D for the test items). All participants 
received the same set of test items and they were instructed to rate the probable truth of each 
statement on a six-point scale (1 = certainly false; 6 = certainly true). Unlike the seven-point 
response scale employed in the study of Begg et al. (1992), the current study used a six-point 
scale which excluded the neutral point so as to force participants to evaluate the probable 
truth of each statement (Brown & Nix, 1996). 
Manipulation check. Participants in the DA condition completed an extra question 
asking them whether they remembered hearing anything from the unattended ear during the 
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audio task. This question served as a manipulation check to ensure that the tone-counting task 
was an effective distraction. 
Procedure 
 The procedure of this experiment followed the three-stage misinformation paradigm 
employed as in previous eyewitness memory literature. Participants were tested individually 
to prevent any unwanted co-witness discussion after viewing the short film. Upon arrival to 
the laboratory, participants were given a consent form to sign. After consenting to participate, 
they were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions (i.e. control, FA or DA 
condition). They were then instructed to sit in front of a laptop computer. 
 In the first phase of the experiment, all participants were informed that they were going 
to watch a short film depicting a robbery and they were instructed to pay careful attention. 
The participants were then asked to put on headphones which connected to the laptop 
computer. The experimenter then started the video; the video was played only once for each 
participant. When the short film ended, the experimenter asked the participant to complete the 
Affective Style Questionnaire.  
 After participants completed this questionnaire, the experimenter explained the next 
phase of the experiment. Participants in the control group were asked to complete a tone-
counting task; specifically, a series of high- and low-pitched tones were played and the 
participants had to count the number of high-pitched tones. To ensure that participants knew 
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the difference between the tones, the experimenter administered two practice trials (each 
contained five tones) and had the participants state the number of high tones after each trial. 
For the FA condition, the experimenter informed the participants that they were going to 
listen to an audio narrative recapping the event they saw in the short film; however, the 
participants did not know that the narrative contained misinformation. For the DA group, the 
experimenter told the participants that the upcoming phase was a dichotic listening task 
which would assess their attentional control. Participants in this group were instructed to 
attend to one ear. In that ear, the participants were presented with a series of tones. To 
motivate them to attend to the tones, scratch paper was provided for them to mark down the 
high tones they heard. At the same time, the audio narrative was presented to the unattended 
ear. Before the dichotic listening task began, the experimenter administered the same practice 
trials used for the control group. After the task was clearly explained to the participants, they 
commenced listening to the audio narrative and the tones. 
 After this audio stimulus phase, all participants performed a distractor task that required 
them to read an unrelated news article and write a basic summary about it. Upon completion 
of the distractor task, all participants proceeded to take the memory tests in the order of free 
recall, cued recall and truth rating tests. The memory test with the least information about the 
short film was administered first. After completing all the memory tests, participants in the 
DA condition completed the manipulation check. 
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 At the end of the experiment, each participant completed a demographics form and fully 
debriefed. Before the participants left, they were instructed to not discuss the experimental 
details with other students. 
Coding 
 Two researchers derived 44 details of the crime scene from the 42-second video clip. 
These details were used as the reference to score participants’ responses to the free-recall test 
(See Appendix E). Two independent coders reviewed and scored all the participants’ written 
responses. A correct item was defined as a description that matched any of the 44 derived 
details. A misinformed item was defined as a description that matched any of the five pieces 
of misinformation supplied as PEI during the audio narrative. An intrusion error was defined 
as false description that came from participants themselves instead of the audio narrative. To 
assess inter-coder reliability, Pearson correlations were computed with the percentage of total 
correct items and the percentage of total misleading items recalled as the dependent variables. 
The results indicated a high degree of agreement among the two raters (r = .842 for 
percentage of total correct items recalled and r = .939 for percentage of total misleading items 
recalled). 
Results 
 First, the results from the manipulation check will be provided. Second, the effect of PEI 
on explicit eyewitness memory will be examined by comparing the free recall and cued recall 
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performances between the three experimental conditions. Finally, implicit eyewitness 
memory was examined by analyzing the truth ratings for each type of statements in the three 
groups.  
Manipulation Check 
 Participants in the DA group were asked to write down anything they could recollect 
hearing with the unattended ear during the earlier tone-counting task. Six participants (30%) 
did not remember anything; 8 participants (40%) replied that they heard a voice describing 
the event they viewed earlier; 4 participants (20%) recollected some specific words or 
phrases that they heard; 2 participants (10%) answered that they heard a general description 
about the event and could also recollect some specific words. None of the participants 
recalled any misinformation supplied in the audio narrative. 
Free Recall 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the impact of 
attention on the accuracy of eyewitness memory. Experimental condition (control group vs. 
FA group vs. DA group) was set as the independent variable while percentages of total correct 
items and total misinformation recalled were the dependent variables.  
 The results revealed a main effect for condition F(2, 57) = 10.58, p < .001, η2 = .27. Post 
hoc comparisons using Bonferroni corrected t-tests indicated that FA group (M = 26.14%, SD 
= 6.48%) recalled significantly more correct information than the control group (M = 
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17.27%, SD = 8.14%) and the DA group (M = 17.39%, SD = 6.19%). There was no 
significant difference between the control and DA group. 
 A Brown-Forsythe test was conducted to compare the percentages of total 
misinformation recalled between the three conditions because the assumption of homogeneity 
of variance was violated for this variable. A main effect for condition was found, F(2, 20.42) 
= 4.03, p = .034, η2 = .12. FA group (M = 8.00%, SD = 16.42) recalled more misinformation 
than the control group (M = .50%, SD = 2.24) and the DA group (M = .50%, SD = 2.24). The 
average percentages of total correct items and total misleading items recalled by the three 
groups are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Mean percentages of total correct items and total misinformation recalled 
 
Cued Recall 
 Cued recall responses were coded into one of the following three categories: 1) correct 
response, 2) misinformation, or 3) other recall errors. Proportion of misinformation recalled 
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ANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of attention on the proportion of recalled 
misinformation. A significant difference was found in the proportion of misinformation 
recalled between the three groups, F(2, 34.50) = 8.37, p = .001, η2 = .23. Tamhane's T2 post 
hoc test revealed that participants in the FA group (M = 17.00%, SD = 17.50%) recalled 
significantly more misinformation than the control group (M = 2.00%, SD = 6.16%). 
However, the proportion of misinformation recalled in the DA group (M = 6.00%, SD = 9.40) 
was not significantly different from the FA group and the control group. The average 
proportion of each type of response in the three experimental conditions are shown in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2 
Mean proportions (%) of different types of responses in the cued recall test 
 
Truth Rating 
 A 3 (experimental conditions) × 4 (types of statements) mixed-design ANOVA with 
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variable was the average truth rating for each type of statements in each experimental 
condition. 
 There was a significant main effect for types of statements on average truth ratings, F(3, 
168) = 232.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .81. True descriptions were rated as the most credible, 
followed by true statements that described the details about which misinformation was 
supplied, then the repeated misinformation, and the false new descriptions were rated as the 
least credible. There were no other main or interaction effects. 
Figure 3 
Truth ratings of the four types of statements 
 
Discussion 
 The goal of this study was to examine whether PEI presented under divided attention 
would lead eyewitnesses to perceive the misinformation as more truthful. Since 
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PEI under divided attention would lead to erroneous eyewitness memory because source-
specifying information was lacking (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). However, the effect of 
implicit learning of misinformation might not necessarily manifest in explicit memory test 
(e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). To examine whether implicit form of PEI would influence 
explicit and implicit eyewitness memory, a third experimental condition, i.e., misinformed 
under divided attention, was added to the existing misinformation paradigm. The truth rating 
test was also added to assess participants’ implicit eyewitness memory.  
 The results of the free recall test indicated that participants who were misinformed under 
full attention recalled significantly more false information than those who were not 
misinformed or those who were misinformed under divided attention. This finding is in line 
with previous eyewitness literature (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). It also supports our first hypothesis that only participants who 
acquired PEI with full attention would exhibit the traditional misinformation effect. However, 
participants in the full attention group also recollected significantly more correct information 
than the other two groups. It is possible that participants in this condition experienced a 
practice effect by listening to the audio narrative, which recapped the crime event that they 
viewed earlier. Although the audio narrative contained five false details, the rest of its content 
might have reinforced participants’ memory for the witnessed event. As a result, the audio 
narrative induced both the misinformation effect and practice effect  
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 In the cued recall test, the proportion of misinformation recalled was compared across 
the three experimental conditions. As predicted, participants who received PEI under full 
attention recalled the highest proportion of misinformation in the cued recall test. Participants 
in the divided attention condition did not differ significantly from the other two conditions in 
the proportion of misinformation recalled. It is because participants who were misinformed 
under divided attention recalled less PEI than their counterparts in the full attention condition 
yet more PEI than the control group. This suggested the possibility that misleading PEI 
acquired unconsciously could mildly alter participants’ explicit memory for the witnessed 
event. 
 Based on the results from the truth rating test, it was found that misleading PEI, 
regardless of whether it was supplied explicitly or implicitly, did not lead the participants to 
rate the misinformation as more credible than the control group. Another unexpected finding 
was that all three groups exhibited the same pattern of truth ratings across the four types of 
statements (i.e., correct descriptions > true statements which described the details about 
which misinformation was supplied > repeated misinformation > false new descriptions). 
Participants in the control condition were expected to rate the repeated misinformation and 
false new descriptions similarly because they were never exposed to the misinformation. A 
possible explanation is that, compared to the true statements and the false new statements, the 
details selected for creating the misinformation were too subtle and minor. For instance, some 
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of the misinformation concerned the colors of the people’s apparels, whereas some of the true 
and false new statements focused on details that were relatively more noticeable, such as the 
robbers’ actions and weapons. As a result, participants from the control condition rated the 
probable truth of the repeated misinformation towards the middle of the scale because they 
were unsure about its truthfulness. Alternatively, the control participants were more certain 
about the truthfulness of the true statements and the false new statements because the details 
these statements concerned were more noticeable in the video. Since the statements used in 
this implicit memory test concerned details that were possibly unequal in terms of their 
memorability, this may have been the reason for the unexpected pattern in truth ratings found 
in the control group. The misinformed under full attention and misinformed under divided 
attention groups also exhibited this pattern of correct descriptions > true statements which 
described the details about which misinformation was supplied > repeated misinformation > 
false new descriptions in their truth ratings. This could be explained by the fact that these 
participants were exposed to the misinformation after viewing the crime event, which led 
them to rate the repeated misinformation as more truthful than the false new statements. 
However, the potential confound found in the control condition might also be the reason for 
such pattern in these two misinformed groups. 
 Taken together, findings from this study supported the first hypothesis that participants 
who were misinformed under full attention would include more false information in their free 
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recall responses. However, the second hypothesis that both misinformed groups would rate 
repeated misinformation as truer than the control group did was not supported. The third 
hypothesis, which predicted a unique pattern of truth ratings in both misinformed groups 
(true statements > repeated misinformation > false new statement), was not supported either 
because this pattern was found in all three groups. 
Limitation and Future Research 
 A major limitation of this study lies in the truth rating test. The details chosen from the 
video for creating misinformation and the details used to compose the true as well as the false 
new statements may not be equally memorable. The discrepancy between the noticeability of 
details that different types of statements concerned might therefore become a confounding 
factor which influenced how participants rate the probable truth of the statements. Future 
research which employs this implicit memory test should therefore assess the memorability of 
each detail in the witnessed event and construct the test with items of similar memorability. 
 In addition, the items in the truth rating test were identical for all participants. The 
problem with this design is that, it is unclear whether the misinformation in the statements of 
repeated misinformation will lead to similar result if it is used to compose true statements that 
described details about which misinformation was supplied, and vice versa. Counterbalancing 
the misinformation, that is, using each piece of misinformation to compose both types of 
statements and administering either one of the two sets of items to each participant, would 
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provide a more accurate picture of how participants perceived the probable truth of the 
misinformation. 
 Another major limitation of this study is that the audio narrative, which contained 
misinformation induced a practice effect in participants who were misinformed under full 
attention. As a result, participants in this condition recalled significantly more correct items 
than the other two conditions. This issue could be solved by having participants who are not 
misinformed (i.e., the control group) listen to the audio narrative with the misinformation 
replaced by correct descriptions after viewing the event. 
 In terms of the ecological validity of this study, the retention interval that participants 
experienced was too short compared to the real-life eyewitness setting. Previous eyewitness 
memory research (e.g., Flin, Boon, Knox & Bull, 1992) found that witnesses, on average, 
experience a retention interval of five months. Although it might be challenging to expand the 
retention interval to several months in the context of an experiment, examining participants’ 
eyewitness memory after a significant length of time, such as two weeks, could provide 
insights into the impact of implicit form of PEI in long term. 
 The influence of implicit learning of PEI should also be examined within the context of 
eyewitness identification with a simultaneous lineup. Implicit learning may play a greater 
role under such a condition since it involves a judging process than a recollecting process. 
Instead of generating a description of the crime event on their own, witnesses have to engage 
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in a process called relative judgement in which they compare the people in a simultaneous 
lineup and select the one who looks the most like the perpetuator (Wells et al., 1998). In 
addition, face identification involves perceptual information processing (Read, 1995). These 
characteristics of eyewitness identification might therefore make it more susceptible to 
implicit forms of post-event information. Such research would provide a better understanding 
of when misinformation may shape the way eyewitnesses recall crime scenes and under 
which conditions they would be influenced more easily. 
Conclusion 
 The present study examined the influence of implicit, misleading post-event information 
by adding a new experimental condition in which participants received misinformation under 
divided attention. While future research is needed to examine the influence of misinformation 
on implicit memory, the present results suggested that it is possible for implicit forms of post-
event information to influence explicit eyewitness memory. Such research will offer greater 
insights into when eyewitnesses may incorporate false information into their testimony and 
help inform the criminal justice system of when an eyewitness account of a crime has been 
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Appendix A 
Detailed Description of the Video 
Two armed robbers (an African American in blue hoodie and a Hispanic man in maroon 
hoodie) went into a café and robbed the customers. There were a total of five customers 
(three men and two women) in the café. The Hispanic man asked the customers to put their 
valuables in a white tote bag with red strips that he was holding. The two men then ran away 
with the African American following the Hispanic man. However, one of the customers (a 
girl in black coat) took out her gun and grabbed the hood of the African American. He pushed 
her off and managed to escape. 
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Appendix B 
Audio Narrative of the Event and Misleading Information 
The video depicted a café. There was a fire safety poster on the wall right next to the 
entrance. A black man who was armed with a pistol entered the café. He was wearing a blue 
sweatshirt and a baseball cap. He pointed his gun to people after he walked into the café. 
Three customers were forced to the corner next to the entrance by another robber, who was a 
Latino man wearing glasses and a maroon sweatshirt. He was holding a pistol on his right 
hand and a blue tote bag on the other hand. The Latino man pointed his gun to the customers 
at the corner and forced them to put their valuables into the bag. The two robbers then ran out 
of the café, with the black man following the Latino man. One of the customers, who was a 
woman wearing a green coat, took out her gun and grabbed the black man’s sweatshirt. The 
robber turned around and pushed her away, then he left the café. 
 
Details in the video Corresponding misleading information 
Both robbers wore the sweatshirt hoods 
over their heads. 
The African American robber was wearing a 
baseball cap. 
There was a poster about first aid for 
choking on the wall. 
There was a fire safety poster on the wall. 
The Latino American was holding a white 
tote bag. 
The Latino American was holding a blue 
tote bag. 
The customer who grabbed the African 
American robber’s sweatshirt was a girl 
with black coat. 
The customer who grabbed the African 
American robber’s sweatshirt was a girl 
with green coat. 
There were five customers in the scene. There were three customers in the scene. 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire for Cued Recall 
1. Was there anything on the wall next to the café entrance?  
2. What were the two robbers wearing and holding at the time of the robbery? 
Black man: 
Latino man: 
3. How many customers were in the café at the time of the robbery? 
4. At the end of the video, a woman grabbed one of the robbers and tried to stop him. What 
was the color of her coat? 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire for Truth Rating 
According to your memory of the crime event, please rate the probable truth of each of the 
following statements on a six-point scale (certainly false: 1, probably false: 2, possibly false: 
3, possibly true: 4, probably true: 5 and certainly true: 6). 
1. Two robbers who were armed with pistols robbed the 
customers in a café. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. There were totally three customers in the café. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. There was a child in the café at the time of the 
robbery. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. The customers were told to put their valuables in the 
tote bag that one of the robbers was holding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. The Latino’s gun went off during the robbery. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. The tote bag that the Latino was holding was white. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. The African American robber was wearing a baseball 
cap. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8. The woman who tried to stop the African American 
man at the end was wearing a black coat. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. There was a poster about first aid for choking on the 
wall next to the café entrance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
10. The cashiers of the café ran after the two robbers after 
the robbery. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Remarks:  
Items 1 and 4 are true descriptions about the video. 
Items 2 and 7 are repeated misinformation from the audio narrative. 
Items 6, 8 and 9 are the correct version of the misinformation provided in the audio narrative. 
Items 3, 5 and 10 are false new descriptions about the video. 
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Appendix E 
Coding for Free Recall Responses 
 The wall is blue 
 There are posters on the wall 
 There is a “Choking” poster on the wall 
 There is a “No smoking” poster on the 
wall 
 There is a poster about “food allergies” 
on the wall  
 A robber, who was black,  
 came in through the entrance door 
 The first robber was wearing a blue 
sweatshirt 
 with a white logo on it 
 The first robber had the hood on his 
head 
 The first robber was wearing light blue 
jeans 
 The first robber had a gun  
 in his right hand 
 The first robber was holding something 
black  
 in his left hand 
 The robbers were cussing  
 and yelling  
 A second robber came from the right 
side  
 The second robber was Latino  
 The second robber had a white tote bag  
 with red strip  
 in his left hand 
 The second robber had a gun 
 in his right hand 
 The customers included three men  
 and two women  
 The second robber told the customers 
to put their stuff in the bag  
 The second robber had a watch on his 
left wrist 
 The second robber had glasses 
 The second robber had a maroon 
sweatshirt 
 that said “Macquarie University” 
 in white 
 The second robber had the hood on his 
head 
 The two robbers ran away,  
 black man followed Latino 
 A woman with a hair bun  
 stopped the black man 
 The woman that stopped the robber had 
a gun 
 The woman that stopped the robber had 
glasses 
 and was wearing a black coat 
 The woman yelled “Stop!” 
 The woman pulled back the hoodie on 
the blue sweatshirt the robber was 
wearing 
 The robber pushed the woman  
 The robber (the one in blue sweatshirt) 
escaped 
